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i. introduCtion
This article examines the statutory, common law, and traditional foundations of property rights in 
pastoral leases in order to look at recent changes in government policy regarding the implementa-
tion of the South Island high country land reform. Called tenure review, this land reform divides 
Crown land into two distinct forms of tenure – freehold title and full Crown ownership to be man-
aged for public conservation. Tenure review began inside the bureaucracy of the Department of 
Lands (now called Land Information New Zealand, or LINZ). The Crown invited holders of pas-
toral rights to enter voluntary negotiations to determine which land would transfer into freehold 
ownership, and which would shift into the public conservation estate. In 1998, Parliament granted 
statutory authority to the administrative process, and formalised the pre-existing rules.
The Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998 (hereinafter CPLA) stated the primary goal of tenure re-
view as ‘ecologically sustainable’ land management in the high country.1 Subject to the primary 
goal, the CPLA stipulated that land ‘capable of economic use’ would be privatised into freehold 
ownership, and land with ‘significant inherent values’ would be protected ‘(preferably) in full 
Crown ownership,’ or (presumably less preferably) by another protective instrument such as a 
covenant. In 199, the Crown pastoral estate made up one-tenth of New Zealand’s landmass. 
Since 199, about one-fifth (about 80) of the original 340 leases have completed the reforms. The 
Crown has privatised 70,08 hectares (or 58 per cent), and shifted 196,78 hectares into public 
conservation land (or 4 per cent).3 Following the exchange of rights, the new freehold title-hold-
ers have paid the Crown $18.5 million to extinguish the Crown’s interest; and the Crown has paid 
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the former pastoral right-holders $37 million to extinguish the pastoral rights in the new conser-
vation land. In total, the Crown has paid new title-holders $18.5 million in ‘equity of exchange’ 
payments.4
As with any change in property regimes, tenure review has been contentious from the start.5 
The question of property rights rose to the fore of the debate in early 006, when a research report 
argued that the pastoral rights were less valuable than freehold rights, and therefore less valu-
able than right-holders and the tenure review administrators appeared to think.6 The right-hold-
ers’ defence of the legitimacy and value of their pastoral rights culminated in successive media 
statements asserting that pastoral rights are very similar to freehold rights.7 In September 006, 
the Cabinet asserted the Crown’s property rights in the pastoral land by announcing that the right-
holders would henceforth be charged rent amount based on a land value that includes amenity 
values such as lake frontage and scenic vistas.8
Through this debate over security and value of property rights in pastoral land, the legitima-
cy of the tenure review process became the subject of mounting academic and public scrutiny. 
4 Ibid.
5 See, eg, North & South magazine described the debate as follows: ‘But our smugness at how lucky we are to have 
such unblemished beauty has been seriously unsettled lately by a realisation these views are at risk due to a govern-
ment policy that’s got away from the politicians and gone over the heads of most New Zealanders. It’s a process 
whereby 10% of New Zealand’s most remote but most beautiful country, owned by the Crown, is being divided up, 
with much of it effectively given away to farmers, who until now have only leased this land. It’s called tenure review 
and it’s been going on for 15 years but it’s only now people seem to be understanding what’s really happening, how 
many iconic landscapes are under threat – and what’s already been lost.’
M White, ‘High Country Hijack.’ North & South (Auckland), November 006, 4.
6 See Ann Brower, ‘Interest Groups, Vested Interests, and the Myth of Apolitical Administration.’ Report submitted to 
Fulbright-New Zealand, February 006.
7 See in late 006, a spokesperson for the High Country Accord, an advocacy group for pastoral right-holders was 
quoted in The Timaru Herald saying ‘in order to get our views across we had to commission an independent report.’ 
‘Economists Hired to Discredit Report,’ The Timaru Herald, (Timaru), 5 November 006, . To announce the re-
lease of the commissioned independent report, the High Country Accord held a press conference at which one of the 
report’s authors stated: ‘The rights of a lessee approximate to ownership rights in the case of high country real estate, 
so long as the lessee continues to use it for pastoralism.’ A pastoral lease was very different from renting, with les-
sees holding title to the land which had been transferred into private hands by the Crown. ‘The fact that this was done 
through a perpetually renewable lease rather than through the transfer of freehold property rights does not change the 
fact that properties concerned are now in private hands.’(Prof. Neil Quigley quoted in ‘High Country Lessees Vindi-
cated by Report’, Otago Daily Times (Dunedin), 7 November 006, 10.
8 Cabinet Business Committee, A Sustainable Future for the South Island High Country: Pastoral Leases Valuation 
Reviews: Report Back, 9 October 006, CAB Minute (06) 37/6.
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Though the right-holders argued that tenure review delivers public benefits,9 several prominent 
conservation, recreation, and taxpayer interest groups began to argue that the public was losing 
more than it was gaining.10 Following several such statements questioning the win-loss calculus,11 
the Cabinet moved to improve procedural quality assurance and ensure greater ministerial over-
sight of tenure review.1 This may represent a distinct paradigm shift for tenure review.13
Specifically the new policy will identify leasehold properties with ‘highly significant lakeside, 
landscape, biodiversity or other values’14 for permanent exclusion. This property identification 
exercise, with a default assumption for lakeside properties, will excise identified pastoral leases 
from the free holding opportunity implicit in tenure review. Though the Crown has enjoyed veto 
power since 199, June 007 is the first exercise of that power.15
9 See in August 006, several conservation groups called for a moratorium on tenure review. The National Business 
Review reported the interest group machinations as follows: ‘Farmers and environmentalists have done a U-turn 
on their respective positions over high country land tenure review in light of a new report that says the review is 
endangering bio-diversity. … The process had generally been supported by environmentalists in spite of concerns 
about some specific deals, whereas a farmer lobby group, the High Country Accord, had complained that landowners 
were getting a raw deal. … But now the farmer lobby is back-pedalling at top speed’, Chris Hutching, ‘Farmers and 
Greenies Swap Positions: Researchers Call for a Halt to High Country Land Review,’ The National Business Review 
(Auckland), 18 August 006.
 The Press reported the one right-holder’s defense of tenure review as follows: ‘Moratorium opposed: Rakaia Gorge 
farmer Duncan Ensor says tenure review is working as well as it can. His back-country station, Glenrock, has been 
in the review process for years, with an agreement likely in weeks. … If Ensor accepts the proposal, 6000ha of the 
7000ha station will be surrendered to conservation. … Ensor said some conservation lobby groups might be getting 
carried away, and he did not want his review held up by a moratorium sought by the Canterbury - Aoraki Conserva-
tion Board.’ John Keast, ‘Halt to Tenure Review Urged’ The Press (Christchurch), 10 August 006.
10 For rising interest group scrutiny, see, eg, www.StopTenureReview.co.nz; and Eugenie Sage, ‘Conservation and pub-
lic being short changed by tenure review’, Otago Daily Times (Dunedin), 8 August 006.
11 See the most prominent expressions of the media attention were on TV3’s Campbell Live (Richard Langston, ‘The 
Great South Island Land Rip-Off’; TV3 Campbell Live, 8 February 007 available at <http:// www.tv3.co.nz/de-
fault.aspx?tabid=11&articleID=03> 6 October 007; in The Press Ian Steward, ‘Stations to become resorts.’ 
The Press (Christchurch), 19 January 006; and the Dominion Post, Sarah Boyd, ‘Fears That Condos Will Be New 
Rabbits’. Dominion Post (Wellington), 14 October 006; and ‘A Blot on Our Landscape’, Dominion Post (Welling-
ton), 0 October 006.
1 Cabinet Business Committee, South Island High Country Landscape, Biodiversity, and Access Issues, 5 June 007, 
Cabinet Business Committee Minute of Decision CBC Min (07) 10/1.
13 C.f. the limited terms of reference for the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment’s (PCE) Investigation 
into tenure review for South Island High Country Crown pastoral leases of June 006 which did not investigate in 
depth property rights. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Investigation into South Island high country 
land tenure review, (006) available at <http://www.pce.govt.nz/projects/00606.shtml> 6 October 007.
14 Cabinet Business Committee ((07)10/1) above n 1, item 11.
15 See Land Information Minister David Parker defends the decision to veto deals in-progress and withdraw some leases 
before they start. As reported in The Press:
 ‘He says tenure review has always been voluntary, for both the lessees and the lessors. “Their rights under their leases 
are not being eroded. Lessees have long said it should not be compulsory for them to have to take part in tenure re-
view. I agree. Neither should it be (compulsory) for the Crown.” He says it is inconsistent that some farmers insist 
tenure review must be voluntary for farmers, but not for the Crown. “We’re talking about landscapes that are special 
to all New Zealanders. We think it’s in the interests of all New Zealanders that we protect these properties where 
we’re happy with the status quo. Pastoral leases protect the status quo more than freehold would.”’
 David Williams, ‘High-Country Headaches,’ The Press (Christchurch), 6 October 007, page 10.
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Tenure review represented for pastoral leaseholders a government sanctioned opportunity to 
effect the transition from lesser use rights to the superior property regime of freehold title. How-
ever Cabinet’s resolution of 5 June 007 to voluntarily exit some tenure review negotiations ac-
knowledges the pre-eminence of government as the grantor of new property rights, and its inher-
ent power to withhold such rights.
Cabinet’s attitudinal change (from confidence in tenure review delivering conservation and 
land management objectives to increasing scrutiny) suggests that it is timely to reflect on a number 
of issues of property law integral to the tenure review debate. Though commonly called pastoral 
lessees, the holders of pastoral rights are more properly described as the holders of an interest 
under Part 4 of the CPLA.
Parts II and III examines the rights of the pastoral right-holder through the prism of their con-
stituent statutory origins. This exercise indicates that the rights of so-called ‘pastoral leaseholders’ 
correspond more accurately to those of a statutory quasi-usufruct. Whilst nomenclature of prop-
erty rights may seem erudite and remote from the vigour of tenure review, it is submitted that if all 
parties properly understood their respective theoretical positions, then the practical imperatives of 
certainty, consistency and transparency would be better served.16
Part IV examines the rhetorical foundation for the right-holders’ claims of legitimacy and 
value. It briefly compares several arguments supporting their claim – the classical economics ef-
ficiency argument, and the Lockean labour theory of property.
Lastly Part V examines the role of government as the grantor and guarantor of property rights. 
It is argued that the Government’s policy change may represent the rekindling of a functioning 
and balanced property rights regime in this vital area.
Pastoral right-holders rely on three distinct but related sources of legitimacy and value for their 
rights – statute, common law, and rhetoric. This article examines the three sources and concludes 
that pastoral rights are conferred by statutory lease, not common law lease. The former is more 
constrained than the latter. It does not confer exclusive possession as the common law defines the 
term nor does it guarantee rights and remedies that are possessory-based (such as trespass). Hence 
much of the rhetoric surrounding pastoral property rights has a flimsy legal foundation. As such, 
despite the prominent narratives, the Crown may set goals and rules for tenure review based on its 
current land use goals,17 rather than according to rhetoric promoted by interest groups.
16 See for example the comments of Professor Neil Quigley that ‘there is a comprehensive misunderstanding of the les-
see’s interests in the land.’
 Quigley, Neil, ‘Tenure review no sinecure for high country farmers,’ New Zealand Herald, (Auckland) 4 January 
007, available at <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/topic/story.cfm?c_id=195&objectid=1040514> 3 August 007.
17 See the Media Statement of the Hon. John Tamihere dated 18 August 003 for the government’s stated high country 
land use goals available at <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocumenyt.aspx?DocumentID=17584> 4 July 007.
 For other land-related goals, see Department of Conservation and Ministry for the Environment, The New Zealand 
biodiversity strategy, (000);
 Land Access Ministerial Reference Group, Walking Access in the New Zealand Outdoors: A report by the Land Ac-
cess Ministerial Reference Group, (007) available at <http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/people-and-their-is-
sues/access/walking-access-in-nz-outdoors> 6 October 007;
 Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand Climate Change, (007) available at <http://www.mfe.govt.
nz/issues/climate>.
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ii. Part 1 CPLa hoLderS – a ConStrained BundLe of rightS
The rights of the 304 South Island High Country Crown pastoral right-holders are prescribed gen-
erally in Part 1 and specifically in section 4 of the CPLA. The section is succinct and superficially 
simple.
A pastoral right-holder has:
a) the exclusive right of pasturage over the land;
b) a perpetual right of renewal for terms of 33 years;
c) no right to the soil; and 
d) no right to acquire the fee simple of any of the land.
Any instrument executed pursuant to section 4 should and must adhere to the four corners of this 
truncated statutory construct. Any additional or ancillary gloss to such rights must be explained by 
reference to this tightly constrained bundle of rights in Part 1 of the Act, and the mutatis mutandis 
scope for the continued application of the Land Act 1948.18
Traditional legal theory describes property as a bundle of rights. This bundle or collection 
of sticks typically includes hallmark rights of unfettered alienability, rights of use, exploitation 
and enjoyment, and the right to exclude. The greatest real property interest known to the Anglo-
common law tradition, the fee simple estate contains the biggest bundle. As the right in question 
varies or diminishes, the bundle of rights itself adapts. Hence from a hierarchical perspective, one 
would expect the fee simple estate to be at the apex of a reverse pyramid, with leasehold interests 
thereunder, and at the bottom of the hierarchy, lesser proprietary interests such as mere equities,19 
or usufructs.
Section 4 CPLA sets out four basic rights.0 The bundle here is small and constrained. Each 
individual ‘right’ shall now be examined in turn.
A. Exclusive right to pasturage over the land
This right is exclusive to the holder. It has been defined at common law as ‘a right to feed animals 
from vegetation growing on the land of another, [emphasis added] or a right to take grass and 
other herbage by the mouths of animals.’1
The common law then subdivides the right into three sub-categories, of which ‘several pastur-
age’ is the closest approximation to section 4. None of these common law distinctions are particu-
larly pertinent, given that the local right is purely statutory, and given the irrelevance of the social 
and geographic conditions of feudal England to contemporary New Zealand.
The blend of statute and residual and applicable common law would suggest that this right 
simpliciter is a right to graze and feed animals from the grasslands and other herbage of the High 
Country. It is a right of use that the holders are not obliged to share with anyone else. 
On a superficial reading, one might assume that an exclusive right to pasture also confers an 
exclusive right of possession, and possessory-based remedies such as trespass. As Part III con-
cludes, such an inference would be incorrect.
18 CPLA s 3.
19 See, eg, Latec Investments Pty Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965).
0 See that these 4 rights were carried over without change from the former section 66 Land Act 1948 (now repealed).
1 Earl de la Warr v Miles (1881) 17 Ch D 535, 588–9.
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B. A Perpetual Right of Renewal for Terms of 33 years
This right is powerful, in that it guarantees perpetuity of duration of term. It ‘rolls-over’ every 33 
years, ostensibly to pay lip service to common law notions of certainty of term.
However in substance it is anomalous that a leasehold can theoretically endure in perpetuity 
(subject only to forfeiture or surrender). It is only the force of statute that guarantees its poten-
tially unlimited life, given that leaseholds at common law demand certainty of, and limitation of 
duration.3
However this right is merely temporal, it is not in itself substantive. It does not confer use 
rights in isolation; rather it confirms that the other use rights (or non-rights as the case may be) 
listed in section 4 have the potential to endure, problematically forever, for the benefit of the hold-
er. Though the right-holder may graze the land forever and may exclude others from doing the 
same, this grazing right will never mature into a right to subdivide or even to exclude uses which 
do not interfere with the statutory right to graze.4
The perpetual right of renewal is purportedly qualified by a rent review process,5 however a 
failure to agree on the fixing of the amount of the ‘rent’ after the expiry of the first instrument’s 
term is far from fatal from the perspective of the right-holder.6 Where the Crown seeks to impose 
a higher fee (representing for example scenic amenity values7) the holder has significant rights to 
dispute the re-calculation without prejudice to his or her rights of renewal. In so appealing a rent 
review, the consequences of a failure to adhere to time limits are all visited on the Crown. But for 
the discretionary forfeiture section 135 Land Act, 1948, the ‘right to renew’ in Part 8 is in sub-
stance an ultimate right to surrender entirely vested in the Part 1 CPLA right-holder.
C. No Right to the Soil
Unlike the positive right to pasturage, this soil right is couched in negative terms. It is thus a non-
right, or one reserved by the Crown.
There is no judicial interpretation of the term ‘right to soil’ in New Zealand land law juris-
prudence. It is thus to the terminology of land law that one must turn. In traditional common law 
parlance, the terms ‘soil’ and ‘land’ are not interchangeable.
‘Land’ implies a three-dimensional space, including the surface soil, and a relative and discre-
tionary area that extends to such airspace height as a land owner can reasonably use and enjoy,8 
and analogously into the sub-soil below. It also implies a bundle of rights (variously referred to as 
estates, interests, hereditaments or tenements) both corporeal and incorporeal. Hence ‘land’ is si-
multaneously physical and intangible. It has the scope to envisage and embrace modern intangible 
rights such as subdivisional or development rights.
 See also CPLA ss 5, 10.
3 Sevenoaks, Maidstone and Tunbridge Railway Co v London Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1879) 11 ChD 65 at 
635–636.
4 See, eg, in the US, activities such as tramping, mountain biking, and even motor-biking are deemed consistent with 
grazing federally-owned lands. Hence all compatible recreational uses are allowed on US federal grazing land.
5 CPLA s 63(3), 63(4) & Land Act 1948 pt 8.
6 CPLA s 10.
7 See Cabinet Business Committee, A Sustainable Future for the South Island High Country: Pastoral Leases Valua-
tion Reviews: Report Back, 9 October 006, CAB Minute (06) 37/6.
8 Baron Bernstein of Leigh v Skyways & General Ltd [1978] QB 479.
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Conversely ‘soil’ remains resolutely physical and tangible. It has been the foundation of le-
gal aphorisms including: ‘whoever has the soil, also owns the heavens above and to the centre 
beneath’ (relating to the limits of land); ‘whatever is affixed to the soil becomes part of the soil’ 
(relating to the doctrine of fixtures) and ‘alluvio’ (being the soil a land owner acquires by accre-
tion). It is described in the Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary as ‘the thin veneer of com-
paratively unconsolidated material covering large areas of the Earth’s surface.’
To borrow another aphorism, land includes all soil, but soil does not include all land. Hence 
‘no right to the soil’ means no rights to the physicality of the surface of the earth. Further, it means 
no rights of use or enjoyment, other than the narrow user rights to graze previously traversed. It 
certainly does not hint at conferring any rights incidental to the wider concept of ‘land’ such as 
subdivision or development.
Further, pursuant to the ejusdem generis rule of interpretation, this non-right should be con-
strued together with its other negative right, the ‘no right to acquire the fee simple.’ Taken togeth-
er, the two clearly preclude the right-holder from all non-pastoral uses of pastoral land without 
prior Crown consent.
D. No Right to Acquire the Fee Simple of any of the land
The tenure of the statutory pastoral right-holder is purportedly frozen in a property rights regime 
that precludes any transition to the fee simple estate of any of the land [emphasis added]. This 
prohibition is mirrored elsewhere in Part 1 of the CPLA.9
However it is the ambiguity and internal tension between Parts 1 and  of the Act that un-
derpins much of the angst of the current tenure review debate. Part 1 curtails pastoral interests 
forever as user rights with no entitlement to fee simple. Conversely Part  anticipates change, 
whereby ‘reviewable lease holders’ may invite the Commissioner of Crown Lands to ‘undertake a 
review’.30 Such review is designed ostensibly to further the Objects of Part ,31 namely ecological 
sustainability, the unshackling of management constraints (direct and indirect) from land capable 
of (better) economic use, the restoration of full Crown ownership of land with ‘significant inher-
ent values’ (or at least appropriate protective mechanisms), and ultimately the freehold disposal of 
reviewable land.
It is the shambolic ‘all things to all people’ nature of Part  that renders this negative right il-
lusory. Whilst it is strictly true that in its current incarnation, the pastoral lease (and occupation 
licence) remain constrained use rights, their possible migration via Part  to inter alia freehold 
disposal fuels the perception (and the partisan rhetoric) that perpetual pastoral rights equate to 
freehold.3 Moreover Lockean notions of the ‘sweat of the brow’ and related catechisms such as 
the law rewards the productive use of land find legislative resonance and comfort in Part , par-
ticularly section 4(a)(ii). This rhetoric/property rights dichotomy shall be addressed in Part IV.
9 CPLA s 1 relating to occupation licences.
30 CPLA s 7.
31 CPLA s 4.
3 When queried about the $18 million paid to new freehold title-holders in equity of exchange payments in tenure 
review, advocates of pastoral right-holders argue that their rights are the moral and economic equivalent of freehold, 
therefore $18 million is a bargain for the Crown. For example, The National Business Review reported in 006: ‘Mr 
Eckhoff said the true value of the Crown pastoral leases was the exclusive use conferred on runholders in perpetuity. 
“It becomes tantamount to freehold title. The only difference is we pay a bit of rental on it.”’ Chris Hutching, ‘Farm-
ers “Load Their Muskets”’ The National Business Review (Auckland), 0 October 006.
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iii. LeaSe, LiCenCe or Statutory uSufruCt?
The CPLA, and indeed the generic Crown lands legislation the Land Act 1948, distinguish be-
tween the terms ‘lease’ and ‘licence’ merely by reference to the quantum of rights each respective 
entitlement confers, and not by any doctrinal justification(s). This purely statute-based descending 
hierarchy is evidenced by a comparison of the ambit of rights in sections 4 and 1 of the CPLA. 
For example ‘pastoral leases’ endure for renewable 33 year terms, whilst ‘occupation licences’ are 
for lesser-fixed terms with a lower security of tenure.
In the Land Act, the distinction between lease and licence is merely one of procedure and 
form.33 Indeed the terms become virtually interchangeable in section 68 where ‘short-term tenan-
cies’ are simultaneously ‘licences’. Another gradation in this statutory taxonomy is that of ‘per-
mit,’ the ‘no-frills’ licence revocable on one month’s notice.34 The interpretation section  (which 
describes either a ‘lease’ or ‘licence’ as meaning the respective interest granted under the Land 
Act 1948, or its predecessors) underscores that the distinction is entirely statutory.
This position should be contrasted with the common law’s treatment of leases. Whether an 
instrument is a lease or not depends on its substance, not its form. If it confers a right of exclusive 
possession to the tenant, guarantees quiet enjoyment, non-derogation from grant, and obliges the 
tenant to yield up vacant possession at the end of the term, then on balance the law will treat it 
as proprietary. Regard will be had to the presence or not of the usual covenants typically seen in 
leases, which suggest the granting of an interest in the land to the putative tenant.35
The substance/form dichotomy is particularly confused in the touchstone common law right of 
‘exclusive possession’36 (at times inaccurately called occupation37), and the concomitant covenant 
of ‘quiet enjoyment.’ Right-holders and their advocates frequently claim that a pastoral lease con-
fers these rights.38 Several Part 1 CPLA instruments (regulations and administrative documents) 
state that a pastoral lease confers “exclusive occupation and quiet enjoyment,”39 though both 
phrases are conspicuously absent from the Land Act and the CPLA. Further, right-holders have 
argued that quiet enjoyment and exclusive possession are so often listed together that it is easy to 
33 Land Act 1948 s 81.
34 Land Act 1948 s 68A.
35 See for example limits on the rights of assignment, and qualified rights of entry.
36 Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 09 at ; Fatac Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [00] 3 NZLR 648.
37 See for example M Wonnacott, Possession of Land, (006) 14–18.
38 See for example, a professor of farm management opined in the Otago Daily Times that ‘The problem starts with 
a poor understanding within the community, and even by some so-called experts, as to runholders’ existing bundle 
of rights. The high-country leases have a perpetual right of renewal. … The runholders also hold a legal right to the 
quiet enjoyment of the land. This means they can legally exclude everyone else from the land in exactly the same way 
as if they held freehold title. And they can do so forever. … In many cases there is not much difference between what 
runholders can do with their leasehold tenure compared to converting it to freehold.’
Keith Woodford, ‘Process Becoming Messy as Rules Change.’ Otago Daily Times (Dunedin) 6 January 007.
39 Commissioner of Crown Lands, The Tenure of Crown Pastoral Land, the Issues and Options: A Discussion Paper 
38, (1994) 11.
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assume they are equivalent.40 Right-holders’ claims and regulatory proclamations in this case re-
semble a chicken and egg conundrum in which it is difficult to know which came first.
However the form of the terms ‘exclusive possession’ and ‘quiet enjoyment’ belie their sub-
stance. At common law ‘exclusive possession’ is a proprietary right to exclude all, and is the 
defining incident of the relationship between the estate holder and their corporeal leasehold estate. 
When used in statutory instruments, it is inaccurate to represent that exclusive possession has the 
same all-embracing ambit. Rather it must be referable to the purpose of the statutory grant. In 
other words, the rights are circumscribed. In the case of pastoral leases, it relates to the degree 
of control necessary ‘to prevent others from engaging in pastoral activities on the same land.’41 
Analogously in the case of another creature of statute, the mining lease, ‘exclusive possession [is 
conferred] only to the extent necessary to prevent others from carrying out mining.’4 Notwith-
standing its ‘common law connotations, the nomenclature of a “lease” (when used as a descriptor 
for pastoral leases) does not of itself grant exclusive possession.’43
Similarly the statutory covenant of ‘quiet enjoyment,’ an adaptation of the common law ten-
ant’s right to freedom from interference in exercising their tenancy rights, is less fulsome. For 
right-holders, this particular freedom from interference must be referable to the legitimate exer-
cise of the primary right to pasturage. That such a right is exclusive [emphasis added] entrenches 
the obfuscation. But it does not extend to a generic common law lessee’s freedom from interfer-
ence; if it did, it would step outside the four corners of the statutory remit and should properly be 
ultra vires:
Land law is but one area in which statute may appear to have adopted general law principles and institu-
tions as elements in a new regime, in truth the legislature has done so only on particular terms.44
Finally the common law demands of leases a certainty of term. William Blackstone explained that 
a lease is called a term ‘because its duration’ or continuance is bounded, limited, and determined; 
for every such estate must have a certain beginning and certain end.45 The assertion that (for ex-
ample) pastoral leases under section 63 Land Act 1948 or ‘Glasgow leases’ do not offend this ba-
sic rule46 is not incontrovertible. A perpetual right of renewal in substance renders the certain end-
date illusory. This is evidenced in the rhetoric of pastoral right-holders themselves who admit:
40 However frequently cited, these phrases are never followed by a citation listing the statute, section, and sub-section 
from which these rights arise. For example, the government-commissioned report on the pastoral rental valuation 
methodology stated the following, with no footnotes: ‘We agree with the interpretation on all of the heads of rights 
set out above except for their view that the SIVs “belong” to the Crown as lessor. This may be a matter of interpreta-
tion because whilst it may be that they do belong to the Crown, the Crown has no access to them due to the lessees’ 
right of perpetual occupation, quiet enjoyment, exclusive use and the right of perpetual renewal [emphasis added] of 
the lease.’
D J Armstrong, R L Engelbrecht, and R L Jefferies, Interim Report High Country Pastoral Leases Review 2005: A Re-
view of Pastoral Lease Rental and Tenure Review Valuation Methodologies and Outcomes Associated with Pastoral 
Lands Throughout the South Island of New Zealand, (005).
41 Western Australia v Ward [00] HCA 8 at [589]–[590] (Kirby J); Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 
(Lee J).
4 Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 (Lee J).
43 Western Australia v Ward [00] HCA 8 [180] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne JJ).
44 Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 19, 4 (Gummow J).
45 Commentaries 1st ed (1766) Bk II 143.
46 See, Hinde, McMorland, & Sim, Butterworths Land Law in New Zealand (1997) 437.
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[P]astoral lessees entered into an agreement with the Crown in perpetuity [emphasis added] when they 
signed their lease documents, and in exchange for their rights to pasturage accepted certain restrictions 
and undertook a caretaker role. They strongly believe in the sanctity of lease documents…47
Unlike the traditional dichotomy between leases for a fixed term (with a certain end date) and 
periodic or continuing tenancies (where the end date is capable of being made certain by notice), 
Part 1 CPLA holders are a hybrid of the two. Their duration is only sustainable by superior force 
of statute. Of course ‘Parliament may …create proprietary interests of a kind unknown at common 
law,’48 and ‘perpetual leases enjoy this legislative dispensation.’49
The common law has maintained the traditional distinction between leases and licences50 by 
effectively quarantining licences to the law of contract. The common law notion that a lease con-
fers a proprietary interest (with attendant implied covenants and the protection of property law 
remedies51) whilst licences are merely contractual permits to occupy for stated purposes is not 
explicit in either the CPLA or the Land Act. These Crown land statutes have largely ignored or 
understated common law lease pre-requisites when creating their statutory interests, save the tag. 
The abiding conclusion is that the Crown Land interests created are purely statutory ones, whose 
ambit depends properly on tenets of statutory interpretation.
That statutory pastoral ‘leases’ should not have the imprimatur of their common law cousins 
has (as traversed) received the highest judicial support in Australia.5 When canvassing the ambit 
of a pastoral right-holder’s right(s), the implied common law covenants of quiet enjoyment and 
exclusive possession have no determinative role. Rather the rights (being creatures of statute) 
should be measured by their constituent statutory instrument of grant. Australian High Court Jus-
tice Gaudron was succinct:
It is clear that pastoral leases are not creations of the common law…That they are now and have for very 
many years been anchored in statute law appears from the cases which have considered the legal charac-
ter of holdings under legislation of the Australian states.53
Pastoral leases as a statutory phenomenon have been described as:
…a limited form of property right. [where] the rights of the pastoralist are set out in various Land Acts. 
…This system …is unique to Australia and New Zealand and evolved last century to control the activities 
of squatters and to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples.54
Historically statutory pastoral leases were recognised as:
giv[ing] only the exclusive right of pasturage in the runs, not the exclusive occup[a]tion of the Land, as 
against Natives using it for the ordinary purposes: nor was it meant that the Public should be prevented 
from the exercise, in those Lands, of such rights as it is important for the general welfare to preserve, and 
47 Evidence of High Country Pastoral Lessees to Ngai Tahu Land Report, Waitangi Tribunal, Department of Justice, 
Wellington (1991) [3..].
48 Sevenoaks, Maidstone and Tunbridge Railway Co v London Chatham and Dover Railway Co (1879) 11 ChD 65 at 
635–636.
49 P Butt, Land Law (5th ed, 007) 887.
50 Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809.
51 See for example the possessory-based remedies of trespass, nuisance and ejectment.
5 Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 19.
53 Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 19 at 04.
54 National Indigenous Working Group (NIWG) Fact Sheet on Pastoral Leases, available at <http:www.faira.org.au/
niwg/fact_sheets/fs.html> 13 August 007.
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which can be exercised without interference with the substantial enjoyment by the lessee of that which 
his lease was really [emphasis added] intended to convey.55
There is no reason in principle, authority or logic to treat the rights of Part 1 CPLA holders as 
anything other than statutory interests. To imbue their rights as those of ‘lessees’ is to inaccurately 
colour the strength of such rights with the common law antecedence of leasehold.56 To avoid 
confusion, nonsensical interpretation, or ‘throw[ing] well-established principles into turmoil,’57 
accuracy of nomenclature is and should be important.
In contrast to leases, the law has recognised lesser user rights (collectively ‘the usufruct’). 
The usufruct is a proprietary right significantly lower on the public’s radar. It is an ancient right, 
documented in Roman law as ‘the right to use and enjoy the things of another without impairing 
their substance.’58 It was also recognised as proprietary, ‘usufruct is a fraction of ownership and 
stands by itself in that it can be granted so as to take effect immediately or from a future day.’59 
The usufruct had acknowledged economic and environmental values. It was a short form, often 
transient, bundle of right(s) that had minimal impact on the common estate, permitting authorised 
modes of use or exploitation provided waste was not a consequence thereof. It fell far short of full 
ownership of land.
The rights of Part 1 CPLA holders are a statutory bundle. They consist of a perpetual and ex-
clusive right to pasturage (‘the primary right’) subject to two prohibitions. Ancillary rights to the 
primary right must be construed from residual provisions of the Land Act (for example that the 
interest may be transferred,60 or mortgaged61) and activities incidental to pasturage, such as erect-
ing fences or yards.6
The bundle is a truncated short-form interest that has as its core rationale an exclusive right 
to pasturage. In the interests of taxonomic good order, it would be more accurate to describe the 
right(s) of Part 1 CPLA holders as a quasi-usufruct of statutory origin.
iV. the rhetoriC/ProPerty rightS diChotomy
It is perhaps not surprising that a statutory lease (or indeed a quasi-usufruct of statutory origin) 
could pass for a common law lease for so long in New Zealand’s high country. Property rights in 
the Anglo-New Zealand common law tradition are captive to the normative force of the rhetoric 
of property law, and high country right-holders use this rhetoric as a third source of legitimacy 
for their property claims. Holders of private rights in public lands in Australia, the US and New 
Zealand have been observed using this rhetorical flexibility to bolster the longevity, breadth, and 
value of their rights.63 These rhetorical claims often resemble traditional narratives more closely 
55 Earl Grey writing to NSW Governor FitzRoy in 1847 as cited in L Godden, ‘Wik, Feudalism, Capitalism and the 
State. A Revision of Land Law in Australia’, 199 APLJ LEXIS 3.
56 ‘Traditional concepts of English law…may still exert …a fascination beyond their utility in instruction for the task at 
hand’, Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 19, 6 (Gummow J).
57 M Wonnacott, Possession of Land (006) 18.
58 Paul, Vitellius, book 3 cited in The Digest of Justinian Vol 1 Book 7.
59 Paul, Edict, book 2 cited in The Digest of Justinian Vol 1 Book 7.
60 Land Act 1948 s 89.
61 Land Act 1948 s 94.
6 See also the definition of ‘improvements’ in s  CPLA (carried over from the Land Act 1948).
63 See Ann Brower, John Page, Amanda Kennedy, and Paul Martin, ‘The Cowboy, the Southern Man, and the Man 
from Snowy River: The Symbolic Politics of Property in the Us, New Zealand, and Australia.’ (forthcoming).
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than statute. As an evolving and constantly dynamic process, the refinement of existing property 
rights, or the creation of new rights, is susceptible to the narratives that sustain rhetoric. These 
narratives include historical, doctrinal and theoretical themes that individually and/or collectively 
have the capacity to influence the nature, content or extent of new property rights.
A. Possession as the root of title
Firstly, pastoral right-holders extract substantial legitimacy from the possessory origins of proper-
ty law.64 In the common law tradition, property rights in land were rooted in seisin, a feudal form 
of possession,65 yielding the maxim ‘[p]ossession is the origin of property’.66
Carol Rose describes possession as akin to yelling this is mine loudly enough to all those who 
may be interested in hearing. If that person says it often enough in a way the public understands as 
clear and unequivocal, ‘[he] gets the prize and the law will help him keep it.’67 
B. The law rewards the productive use of land
This narrative takes root in John Locke’s his labour theory. If ‘every Man has Property in his own 
Person [it follows that] [t]he labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands …are properly his.’68 
In common law, this Lockean principle is one of the important theoretical grounds that rational-
ises the doctrine of adverse possession. Pastoral right-holders defend their rights, their privileged 
status in tenure review, and the privatisation of Crown land on Lockean grounds.69 This Lockean 
narrative is further supported in the academic anthropology literature.70
64 ‘The rights of a lessee approximate to ownership rights in the case of high country real estate. … The fact that this 
was done through a perpetually renewable lease rather than through the transfer of freehold property rights does 
not change the fact that properties concerned are now in private hands.’ Professor Neil Quigley, consultant to high 
country right-holder advocacy group High Country Accord, quoted in ‘High Country Lessees Vindicated by Report.’ 
Otago Daily Times (Dunedin), 7 November 006.
65 See generally the doctrines of tenure and estates.
66 C M Rose, ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’ The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1985) 73, 
74.
67 C M Rose, ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’ The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1985) 73, 
81.
68 J Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. V s 7 cited in M J Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ cited in R C El-
lickson, and C M Rose, and B A Ackerman (eds), Perspectives on Property Law (3rd ed, 00).
69 In a press release responding to the conservationist groups’ August 006 call for a moratorium on tenure review 
high country advocacy group, the High Country Accord, defends holders right to retain land as freehold by arguing 
that ‘the land that lobbyists want transferred back to the Crown has been farmed for 150 years.’ Though not directly 
invoking Locke, this mention of labouring the land is immediately followed by the following claim of ownership: 
‘There is also a wilful disregard … of the legal position of high country leases. The fact is that the land is perma-
nently in private hands.’ Finally, tenure review would be less difficult and acrimonious, argues the farming lobby, ‘if 
everyone accepted that high country lessees were capable of good stewardship of their land, and that land they farm is 
theirs.’
High Country Accord, Tenure Review Can Provide Win-Win Outcomes High Country Accord 15 August 006 cited avail-
able at <http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/index.php?page=11
70 Anthropologist Michele D. Dominy testified to the Waitangi Tribunal that pastoral right-holders’ ‘Material affinity 
[for the land] is expressed in the value runholders place on their sense of ownership in the land they farm and inhabit. 
It is also expressed in the value place on the long term security of tenure.’
Michelle D. Dominy, ‘New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal: Cultural politics of an anthropology of the high country’, (1990) 
Vol. 6 No.  Anthropology Today 11, 13–14.
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C.Privileges conferred on right-holders by narratives
Right-holders’ use rights of High Country lands (in some cases back to 1856) entitle them as a 
class of initial users to a privileged status. This status takes four forms within the legislative re-
gime of the CPLA, and arises from ideas from law and economics.
Firstly, the longevity of tenure coincides with (and likely arises from) the classical econom-
ics notion that assigning long-lived property rights gives the right-holder the economic incentive 
to develop and improve the economic productivity of the land. In 1948, the Crown created the 
statutory instrument of a pastoral lease in its current form with the perpetually renewable tenure. 
Though the use rights conferred were narrow, the longevity of tenure was likely designed to en-
courage pastoral development.71 Adding the classical economic logic to the Lockean, it is good 
public policy to award title to the person who efficiently cultivates or maintains his or her land, 
rather than an impliedly negligent absentee owner who has not checked their land for the period 
of limitation. In the pastoral context, it is similarly good public policy to unshackle appropriate 
reviewable land from management constraints (direct and indirect) that hold it back from its most 
economically efficient use. Hence the CPLA echoes both Locke and classical economics by re-
warding the productive owner with ‘the freehold disposal of reviewable land.’7
In contrast to the perpetual renewability granted by statute, the exclusive possession privilege 
appears to arise from an erroneous inference that a pastoral lease is a common law lease. As sub-
stantial case law refutes the inference, this privilege has no legal basis.
Likewise, when it comes to tenure review negotiations, this inferred exclusive possession right 
appears to make the right-holder a monopolist. When the Crown disposes of its interest in pasto-
ral land, it restricts itself to dealing only with the existing tenant. It neither sells land at auction 
nor entertains any other bids for freehold title.73 Further, the right-holder may veto a deal at any 
time. While the Public Works Act requires the Crown to offer first purchase option to the original 
(impliedly indigenous) when it sells land, the current right holder is not the original owner. Hence 
this monopolist power appears to rest on the lease, not on other statute. That reliance appears 
ill-placed.
Finally, in addition to limiting the Crown to negotiate with the existing tenant, the illusory ex-
clusive possession seems to devalue the monetary value of the Crown’s interest in the land.74
While the perpetually renewable privilege does seem to serve the goal of efficiency, as defined 
by classical economics, the latter three privileges have legal grounding that is shaky at best. Using 
71 Indeed The Press reports this link between security and investment: ‘Federated Farmers former high country chair-
man John Aspinall … said in a crucial move in 1948, leaseholders were given the right to occupy the land in perpetu-
ity. This was to give leaseholders the security needed to invest in good land management.’
Kamala Hayman, ‘Study Says Tenure Review Flawed.’ The Press (Christchurch), 3 February 006.And the Otago Daily 
Times reports similarly: ‘[Mr Ensor said] “Pastoral leases have been incredibly good thing for the high country.” The 
idea was to give lessees certainty of tenure, confidence to invest in improvements and to make the business sustain-
able in the long term. In short, he said, it was designed to look after the land.’
Neal Wallace, ‘A Land Grab, or a Way to Preserve Modern Heritage? Tenure Review of South Island High-Country 
Leases Seems to Be Satisfying Few People.’ Otago Daily Times (Dunedin)  January 004.
7 See CPLA s 4(c)(ii).
73 See A Brower, P. Meguire, and A. Monks, (in review) ‘Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Sub-Agents in New 
Zealand Land Reform.’
74 ‘With no access to these SIVs in perpetuity, (that is while the land is held in a pastoral lease) they can be of no value 
to the Crown.’ Armstrong, Engelbrecht, and Jefferies, above n 40.
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public resources to honour illegitimate rights hints of a breach of public trust. While efficiency is 
good, so is good governance. Efficiently breaching the public trust rarely satisfies the Court.
D. Narratives of Ownership and the Law
Coase argues that the initial allocation of property rights is of little consequence to the long-term 
efficiency of outcomes, as long as the allocation is clear and holders are free to bargain away from 
it.75 This Coasean clarity and freedom are necessary for an efficient property rights regime. We 
submit that vigilant attention to statutory and common law foundation of rights is equally neces-
sary for good governance. When the government uses public resources to erroneously honour a 
perceived right with no statutory or legal foundation, it is improper governance (no matter how 
efficient). Therefore a functioning and vigilant property rights regime should be capable of demar-
cating the fine line beyond which such narratives should not pass. Transgressing this line of pro-
bity is a risk that the law constantly must resist. For the law to over-reach is the start of a ‘slippery 
slope,’ where rhetoric outweighs substance and new property rights risk the stain of illegitimacy.
Indeed while narratives about land and ownership are important to the fabric of the high coun-
try culture,76 they have limited utility in property law’s process of allocating rights. Statutes and 
common law, not narratives, confer rights. English Law Lord Millett affirms that ‘property rights 
are determined by fixed rules and principles. They are not discretionary. They do not depend on 
ideas of what is “fair, just and reasonable.”’ Such concepts, which in reality mask decisions of 
legal policy, have no place in the law of property.’77
V. the roLe of goVernment
The role of government in creating new property rights is amply demonstrated in tenure review, 
especially in light of the Cabinet Minute of June 007. Robert Nelson ascribes the creation of 
new property rights as an unintended consequence of the intervention and implementation of gov-
ernment policy. Nelson describes a four-stage process of new property rights under the heading 
‘Fencing the Modern Commons.’78 The first stage is when ‘demands for use of the resource grow 
large enough to create a congestion problem.’79 This leads to the need for government control of 
the resource. The second stage arrives when government establishes a permit system to allocate 
the resource to specific users. This allocation creates a class of ‘initial users’ who defend their 
privileged status quo against later adverse change. ‘At some point, the[ir] dominant influence … 
becomes accepted as the norm and existing users have acquired de facto private property rights.’80 
The third stage occurs when these rights acquire the fundamental quality of alienability, such that 
75 See Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 3, No. 1,3,5.
76 Michelle D. Dominy, ‘New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal: Cultural politics of an anthropology of the high country,’ 
(1990) Vol. 6 No. , Anthropology Today 11, 13.
77 Foskett v McKeown [000] 1 AC 10, 17 (Lord Millett).
78 Robert Nelson, ‘Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property Rights Evolve’ (1986) U. Ill. L. Rev 
361, 374.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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‘the rights become detached and independently transferable.’81 Finally the ‘government regulatory 
agency formally transfers use rights to the private user and then ceases its regulatory activities.’8
The freehold disposal of Crown land as freehold83 epitomises Nelson’s theory. Demand for the 
resource that is High Country pastoral land instigated regulation through a permit system embrac-
ing pastoral leases with perpetual rights of renewal, together with lesser use rights under special 
term leases and occupation licences. These initial users, in particular the pastoral right-holders 
with rights of perpetual renewal, have defended the privileged status quo by arguing the duration 
of their title equates to de facto ownership.84 The 80 new title-holders who have completed tenure 
review, have successfully matured their de facto user permit property right into a detached, alien-
able and fully private right. Under the Nelson model, the Crown has vacated its regulatory role, 
devolving authority over land use to regional resource management authorities. One Regional 
Council has expressed anxiety at Councils’ lack of preparedness for this devolution.85
However the role of government is a ‘double-edged sword.’ Carol Rose states that govern-
ment can do much for property86 including the creation of ‘off the rack property entitlements,’ the 
termination of obsolete property rights, and the transition from one property regime to another. 
Property creates the macro-environment conducive to good governance but (perversely) within 
‘smaller groups,’ (such as the original 340 pastoral right-holders) government has a powerful de-
terminative role as the ‘shaper’ of property. As shaper, it can set goals for which rights are created 
in tenure review. Those goals can follow any guidelines – from the NZ Biodiversity Strategy,87 
to the Walking Access Panel’s recommendations,88 or even to the latest trend in climate change 
mitigation.89
Similarly, the Government is the grantor and guarantor of property rights.90 What the gov-
ernment gives, it can equally take away. It need not follow rhetoric, no matter how prominent. 
Rather it could imbue the Lockean notion of ‘productive use’ with a more contemporary environ-
mental ethos, such that the law should properly reward landholders who act as good custodians. 
Indeed, in 006 the government stated its willingness to remit rent in exchange for contributions 
to “sustainable management” which exceed the good husbandry statutory requirements. Examples 
of such exemplary contributions include pest and weed control or improved public access,91 or 
limiting stock levels in furtherance of Crown conservation objectives. Indeed when Cabinet an-
81 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
83 CPLA s 4(c)(ii).
84 See Hutching, above n 34.
85 Keast, John Halt to tenure review urged, The Press, (Christchurch) 10 August 006, 3.
86 Carol Rose, ‘What Government Can do for Property (And Vice Versa)’, cited in N Mercuro and W J Samuels (eds), 
The Fundamental Interrelationships Between Government and Property (1999) 09
87 Ministry for the Environment, ‘New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy,’ Wellington, NZ. Available at <http://www.bio-
diversity.govt.nz/picture/doing/nzbs/index.html>  November 007.
88 See for example the Crown negotiated for access arrangements in Hunter Valley Station Limited at Timaru v. The 
Attorney General CA CA 38/05 6 May 006. The Walking Access Panel’s report is found available at <http://www.
walkingaccess.org.nz/publications.html>  November 007.
89 See above n 17.
90 R J Goldstein, ‘Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property 
Law’, (1998) 5 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 347
91 The Land Act requires the right-holder practice ‘good husbandry’ including weed control, but not all exotic woody 
plants are classified as a weed requiring such control.
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nounced an increase in pastoral rents to include amenity values inherent in high country land, it 
intimated a willingness to negotiate lower rent for higher conservation stewardship or recreation 
access.9 Such a negotiation to serve the Crown’s non-pastoral goals would be well within the 
Crown’s purview. The Crown should enter negotiations open to a broad range of outcomes, and 
ever cognisant that right-holder’s interest is a statutory construct, not a common law lease with its 
attendant privileges.
V. ConCLuSion
The right-holders interest is a constrained bundle, not a leasehold estate as understood at com-
mon law. As such, the New Zealand pastoral lease must be interpreted within the confines of its 
statutory remit, disregarding common law gloss of exclusive possession and the rhetoric that has 
influenced property rights to date. In understanding that the primary right is an exclusive right 
of pasturage, any attendant rights must refer to the primary right. Hence the holder may exclude 
competing graziers or preclude activities inconsistent with pasturage, but may not infer that such 
exclusive pastoral rights are the economic equivalent to freehold title.
The tenure review journey is far from over. In what started as a perceived ‘win-win’ for effi-
cient land management for pastoral right-holders, and broad conservation objectives, the tenor has 
subtly but significantly changed since 5 June 007. How it plays out remains to be seen.
It is submitted that the journey ahead would be better served by some taxonomic coherence 
in defining the rights of Part 1 CPLA holders, and an awareness of the legal rhetoric that has the 
scope to muddy rather than clarify the debate. The fundamental expectation that a property rights 
regime delivers outcomes that are certain, consistent and transparent depends inherently on such 
an analysis.
9 See question number 9 ‘What options will be available to lessees who can’t afford the rents?’ in Minister of Land 
Information (006) ‘Media Questions and Answers – Review of valuation methods for pastoral lands.’ Wellington, 
NZ, available at <www.linz.govt.nz/core/crownproperty/highcountry/valuationreview/mediaqa/index.html#9> 6 
October 007.
